Cultivation and the perceived realism of stories by Busselle, Rick W. & Bilandzic, Helena
9. Cultivation and the
Perceived Realism of Stories
Rick Busselle & Helena Bilandzic
The poet does not require us to be awake and believe; he solicits us only to yield
ourselves to a dream and this too with our eyes open, and with our judgment per-
due behind a curtain, ready to awaken us at the first motion of our will: and mean-
time, only, not to disbelieve. (Coleridge, 1817/1907, p. 189)
Theory and research suggest that relationships between media exposure and
media effects are influenced by the extent to which audience members judge
media content to be realistic. One is tempted to conclude that as perceived real-
ism increases so does media’s influence. However, conceptual and method-
ological complications challenge too simplistic a conclusion (see Hall, 2009a).
These complications fall into three interrelated categories: (1) conceptualiza-
tions of perceived realism, (2) how realism varies across different content cat-
egories (fiction, non-fiction, or reality-based) and from one genre to another
within categories (e.g., reality dating or fly-on-the-wall reality), and (3) the
extent to which we are by nature either disbelieving or credulous in our con-
sumption of media content.
Cultivation theory describes how mediated stories construct reality for
audience members and societies (Gerbner, 1998, 1999; Gerbner & Gross,
1976; Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2009; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan,
Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002). In this chapter we are not directly concerned
with the social construction of reality as cultivation theory articulates it.
Instead we focus on perceived realism as the comparisons audience members

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make between the constructed realities they interpret as the actual world and
the representations of those realities they observe in media. We might think
of perceived realism as the extent to which viewers judge that the people and
events they encounter in media are portrayed as would be expected, given the
socially constructed understandings of the actual world that a given viewer
brings to the media experience. There are two important elements to this def-
inition. First, it recognizes that the actual world audience members take as
“reality” is a social construction based on their immediate and mediated expe-
riences as well as their own traits and tendencies. Second, it defines perceived
realism as based on an expectation audiences have of content that originates
in that socially constructed reality.
An array of conceptual and operational definitions of perceived realism
exists in the literature (for reviews, see Busselle & Greenberg, 2000; Potter,
1988), and scholars continue both to redefine the concept (e.g., Shapiro,
Barriga, & Beren, 2010) and to question its efficacy (Pouliot & Cowen,
2007). Such a lack of consensus might suggest that scholars have yet to iden-
tify the best definition of perceived realism. We argue that this is not the case.
Instead, we suggest that what constitutes realism or authenticity, and there-
fore perceived realism, varies depending on what one is watching. In essence,
audience members use different criteria to judge realism in different media con-
texts. Thus, the appropriate conceptualization of perceived realism depends on
the nature of realism in a given genre or content category. Further, it is not
clear from the research whether viewers, listeners, or readers actively and rou-
tinely evaluate realism or only object to its absence (Busselle & Bilandzic,
2008). One approach suggests that individuals are incredulous by nature but
suspend disbelief to a greater or lesser extent while consuming fictional sto-
ries (for an overview, see Worth, 2004). An alternative is that audiences are
accepting by nature, assuming authenticity until challenged otherwise (e.g.,
Gerrig & Rapp, 2004). Thus, the task for media scholars with respect to real-
ism is to understand what “realism” means in different contexts and when and
under what conditions audience members make judgments about it.
Cultivation theory, with its focus on storytelling (Gerbner & Gross,
1976), is an especially useful domain for considering realism. This is because
a considerable amount of research has focused on perceived realism as a
moderator or mediator of cultivation effects (e.g., Busselle, 2001; Potter,
1986; Quick, 2009). It is also because cultivation theory relies on stories as
the primary communicative unit of influence (Busselle, Ryabovolova, &
Wilson, 2004; Gerbner, 1999). Pinpointing the story as a starting point for
investigating realism helps to focus theoretical considerations related to both
processes and outcomes and allows us to narrow and frame our discussion in
useful ways.
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In this chapter we explore the concept of perceived realism from the per-
spectives of cultivation theory and narrative processing. We begin with issues
of definition.
Conceptualizing Realism
Scholars have generated a range of items and scales to assess audiences’ inter-
pretations of the accuracy, authenticity, or verisimilitude of media content. In
doing so, they have struggled with several issues. One is a difficulty in know-
ing what criteria audiences use to judge realism. A second is that the criteria
for judging realism may change from one genre to another. A third compli-
cation relates to the specificity of realism judgments. Judgments about specific
content, such as a program or segment shown in an experimental setting, may
be very different from more abstract judgments about an entire genre, such
as responses to perceived realism questions asked in a survey.
These complications have contributed to a proliferation of realism items and
scales that vary in at least three ways (Busselle & Greenberg, 2000). First, real-
ism instruments purport to assess different conceptual dimensions, such as
whether television reflects the reality of social interactions and situations (e.g.,
Dorr, Kovaric, & Doubleday, 1990; Wright, Huston, Reitz, & Piemayat,
1994), the extent to which events typically happen in real life as they are por-
trayed in media (Shapiro & Chock, 2003), or whether representations are
plausible in the real world (Elliott, Rudd, & Good, 1983; Elliott & Slater,
1980). Second, they ask about different objects within media content, such as
people, events, and behaviors (e.g., Greenberg & Reeves, 1976). Third, they
ask about realism at different levels of specificity, ranging from a specific story
or episode (e.g., Bahk, 2001; Slater, Rouner, & Long, 2006; Ward &
Rivadeneyra, 1999) to genres or categories (e.g., Rubin, Perse, & Powell,
1985; Perse, 1990) to television in general (e.g., Busselle, 2003; Potter, 1986).
In some experimental settings realism has been manipulated rather than
measured. Typically participants are shown stimulus content that is fictional
or nonfictional, or they are told that the same stimulus is real or not real. In
some cases the participants respond differently depending on the manipula-
tion (e.g., Atkin, 1983; Berkowitz & Alioto, 1973; Konijn, Walma van der
Molen, & van Nes, 2009), although not in all cases (e.g., Feshbach, 1976),
suggesting that perceived realism is open to the interpretation of the viewer
as much as the definition of the researcher (Potter, 1988).
With respect to conceptual dimensions, nearly a dozen separate terms can be
found in the literature describing realism (for reviews, see Busselle & Greenberg,
2000; Potter, 1988). Early research focused on the notion of similarity when
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comparing portrayals to their real world counterpart, such as police officers
or teachers (e.g., Greenberg & Reeves, 1976; Wright et al., 1994) and actions
or events, such as crimes or emergencies (e.g., Busselle, 2001; Reeves, 1978).
This may have been under the assumption that television images which do not
look or feel like the real world have no influence on perceptions of real life.
In this context a portrayal was thought to be realistic if people or events were
represented as they were assumed to appear in the actual world. A second ele-
ment of these comparisons recognized that fictional representations may vary
with respect to the likelihood or probability of people existing or events
occurring (e.g., Hall, 2003; Wright et al., 1994), whether similar people or
events could plausibly occur (e.g., Elliott et al., 1983), or the nature of how
events would typically occur if they were to occur (Shapiro & Chock, 2003;
Shapiro & Fox, 2002).
In fantasy genres there may be no apparent relation between a portrayal
and the real world. Events and creatures may not exist or be possible in the
real world. But, at the same time, these portrayals may seem authentic, or not
inauthentic, in meaningful ways. Potter (1988) recognized a distinction
between the extent to which people and objects look like modern day, real
life—syntactic realism—and the realism of human interactions and relations,
regardless of surface appearances—semantic realism (for a slightly different con-
ceptualization of this distinction, see Pouliot & Cowen, 2007). For example,
Harry Potter’s Dumbledore is a 150-year-old wizard. At one level he is
absurdly unrealistic and could not exist in the actual world. Yet, his grandfa-
therly relationship with the protagonist, Harry Potter, may seem realistic to
the extent that Dumbledore’s death was devastating for both Harry Potter and
the audience, evoking emotions in both that are quite real.1
Busselle and Bilandzic (2008) outlined a number of ways in which portrayals
might be seen as unrealistic based on the potential for audiences to observe
inconsistencies. They argue that a portrayal may seem unrealistic if it is incon-
sistent with an audience member’s expectations based on previous real life expe-
rience, previous mediated experience, or previous experience with a genre or
media category. Further, portrayals may seem unrealistic if the story is internally
inconsistent (Hall, 2003) or incoherent (Graesser, Olde, & Klettke, 2002; Rapp
& Gerrig, 2002). Here realism may depend on the extent to which people and
events are logical or appropriate given earlier events and character develop-
ment. Recently, Shapiro et al. (2010) demonstrated a relation between perceived
realism and causal attributions made in a text about characters’ behaviors, sug-
gesting that logical inferences play a role in realism perceptions.
It is important to recognize that some studies have allowed respondents to
define realism for themselves by simply asking, “how realistic” is a given program,
genre, or medium. For example, Quick (2009) asked viewers of the medical
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drama, Grey’s Anatomy, to rate the series on three continua—realistic-unreal-
istic, believable-unbelievable, and credible-not credible—which were combined
into a single scale. The study found that the scale positively mediated the rela-
tion between viewing level and favorable perceptions of doctors. One limita-
tion of using an open definition such as this is uncertainty about what viewers
mean when they report that content is realistic, believable, or credible. At the
same time, there is an advantage in reducing the likelihood that a respondent
does not share the researcher’s definition. That is, while we may be uncertain
about what realism means for viewers in a given context (e.g., to Grey’s
Anatomy viewers), the empirical evidence that realism plays a role in the rela-
tion between exposure and perception is important.
In summary, conceptualizations of perceived realism originated as judg-
ments about the similarity of portrayed characters and events to their real world
counterparts. This may have followed the assumption that content with no
obvious connection to the actual world would have no influence. The concept
was expanded to include assessments of the plausibility or likelihood of fictional
events occurring in the actual world. Then, the concept was expanded further
to recognize that even stories of fantastical people and events are “realistic”
to the extent that they make sense according to an internal logic. Finally, there
is some evidence that part of perceived realism is related to causal attributions
suggested in a portrayal. We now turn to the nature of realism in different gen-
res and content categories.
A Moving Target
Research on cultivation theory most frequently tests the central hypothesis
that exposure to media (typically television) is related to perceptions of the
actual world. Usually exposure is operationalized as hours of television
viewed on an average day (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2009) or in
terms of the viewing of specific genres (Bilandzic & Busselle, 2008; Bilandzic
& Rössler, 2004), such as soap operas (Shrum, 1996), crime-dramas (Busselle
& Shrum, 2003) or action-adventure programs (Potter & Chang, 1990).
Stories told in different genres vary in both topic and structure (e.g.,
Pyrhönen, 2007). For example romantic comedies deal with topics related
to relationships and tend to follow an explication-complication-resolution
structure (Lyden, 2003). Mysteries typically begin with the commission of
a crime and are resolved with the revelation of the culprit and his or her
method (Mittell, 2004). Our present concern is less with different genres per
se than with the role of realism across the broader content categories of fic-
tion, nonfiction, and the hybrid, reality-based genres.
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With the exception of abstract media art, all media content is representa-
tion, usually of people (or creatures), places, and events. Representations are
not reality, but “stake a claim on reality” through an implied relationship with
the actual world (Grossberg, Wartella, Whitney, & Wise, 2006, p. 196). The
nature of that relationship depends on the content in question and determines
what judgments are available about the realism of that content.
Nonfiction has a direct relationship to specific, real people and events.
Therefore, judgments related to realism are limited to the realm of accuracy
and representativeness. Available criticisms focus on bias, sensationalism, or
the veracity of facts (Maier, 2002; Newhagen & Nass, 1989). At a more
abstract level, questions about the realism of nonfiction may focus on the rep-
resentativeness of the events and facts linked to an inferred category, such as
whether news reports in general represent news events as they are in life
(Rubin, Perse, & Powell, 1985; Perse, 1990) or if topics, such as crime, are
exaggerated or underrepresented in news programs (Chiricos, Padgett, &
Gertz, 2000). Realism judgments about both specific events and content cat-
egories assume that the people and events represented do or did exist in the
actual world. Thus, realism is limited to the accuracy with which those events
are reported or documented.
Conversely, fictional representations typically make no claim about spe-
cific real individuals or events. Instead, representations are linked to categories
of the real world through fictional characters and events. In fiction, the
realm of story elements to which accuracy can be applied is determined by
the story world. Story world includes time and place as well as the logic and
rules of the story. For example, modern day London is governed by the logic
of the actual world, unless Jack The Ripper has time-travelled to the present
from the past, in which case the story world includes the ability to time travel
as well as all of the logical implications of that possibility. In a work of fiction
that takes place in an actual world setting (e.g., a crime-drama), perceptions
of accuracy in the form of similarity to the perceived real world likely play a
larger part in realism judgments. This may be because we use the actual world
as the default reality unless a representation constructs an alternative reality
(Segal, 1995). For example, participants listing thoughts after viewing an
episode of Law & Order, a modern crime-drama, were quick to notice when
police officers “busted” into an apartment without a search warrant or failed
to read suspects their Miranda Rights (Quintero Johnson & Busselle, 2005).
As story worlds depart from the actual world, the requirement for accuracy
applies to fewer elements of the representation. For example, some audience
members object when a cowboy appears to have an unlimited supply of bul-
lets in his “six-shooter,” but not when a Storm Trooper’s “blaster” can fire
ad infinitum.
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Here we can draw two conclusions. First, as the story world departs from
the actual world there is a diminishing of the realm of the story to which real-
ism vis-à-vis perceived similarity to the actual world applies. At the same time
there is a limit to how much a story can deviate from the actual world because
realism always applies at the level of basic human behavior and basic logic. For
example, the generally accepted conventions of human behavior prohibit a
character from intentionally causing his or her own death except as a result of
mental illness or altruism, assuming non-altruistic suicide is always caused by
some form of mental illness. Similarly, the laws of logic preclude the reversal
of temporal order in causally related events; while time travel is possible in many
stories, a character can never go forward in time to change the past.
The second conclusion is that as one moves from nonfiction to fiction, real-
ism as representativeness and accuracy gives way to realism as plausibility.
Shapiro and colleagues (Shapiro et al., 2010; Shapiro & Chock, 2003) have
pointed out that audience members may imagine how fictional events would
occur if they were to occur. In this case audiences assess realism by consider-
ing the relation between the portrayal and their image of what could or prob-
ably would happen or how people could or probably would behave under a
given set of circumstances.
Existing between fiction and non-fiction are hybrid, reality-based genres
(Hill, 2005; Nabi et al., 2006; Ouellette & Hay, 2008). As Nabi, Biely,
Morgan, & Stitt (2003) point out, categorizing reality-based programs is dif-
ficult because there are so many variations, and new iterations are introduced
with each new television season. Reality-based programs’ claim on the real
world differs from both fiction and nonfiction. This relationship appears to
manifest in two forms. In one case ostensibly naturally occurring, real events
are captured on video and replayed for the audience (e.g., Cops, America’s
Funniest Home Videos). Here, realism may depend largely on the viewer’s sense
that the video is not staged (Antony, 2010), which probably matters to the
extent that viewers’ expectations of actuality are met or violated. That is, if one
expected to see actual police procedures or actual accidents, the sense that an
event was staged would not meet expectations.
In another type of reality-based program events are real in the sense that
they are not the product of special effects or computer-generated imagery. So
when a man eats a handful of live worms, he is actually eating live worms. In
this sense, the relation between the representation and the event may be
more direct than is the case in traditional nonfiction. For example, news
reports often do not have video of a news event itself, but only images of the
aftermath and possibly eye-witness testimonies. In reality-based program-
ming the representation is real and linked to an actual person in the real
world. At the same time, the real event is staged (Hill, 2005) or manipulated
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(Hall, 2009b). The staged nature of events in many reality-based genres chal-
lenges the logic of traditional realism judgments. For example, staged events
are both unlikely to occur in the real world but do occur when program pro-
ducers create artificial situations; these situations are both implausible in real-
ity and do occur under artificial conditions; and events would both not happen
as portrayed and apparently did happen as witnessed. In reality-based genres
assessments of realism may be based on the extent to which characters or par-
ticipants behave as one would expect them to, given the unrealistic or contrived
situation in which they find themselves. Of course, the staged nature of real-
ity-based programming varies. But even in so-called “fly-on-the-wall” pro-
grams, in which participants ostensibly go about their normal lives while
being recorded, audience members appear to be aware that behavior may be
influenced by the presence of cameras and recording devices. In interviews with
reality-TV viewers, Hill (2005) found that audience members appear to adjust
their expectations to account for the artificial nature of the situation presented
in the program.
Nabi et al. (2007) provides an interesting illustration of how perceived real-
ism might work in reality-based content. She asked respondents to rate 33 real-
ity programs representing a broad range of sub-groups of the genre (e.g.,
crime, make-over, talent contests) on 12 dimensions, including realism.
Despite the fact that all the programs were reality-based and covered a wide
range of potential perceived realism—from very unrealistic to very realistic—
the perception of realism was not a strong determinant of how the programs
clustered in the minds of respondents. This suggests that rather than catego-
rizing reality programming along a realism continuum, individuals adjust
their interpretations of what realism means in different programs or categories.
The important point is that the variety of relationships between repre-
sentations and the real world across the media landscape makes perceived real-
ism different from other constructs of interest to communication scholars (e.g.,
information seeking, probability estimates, behavioral intention) because the
nature of “realism” itself changes from one content category to the next. The
types of judgments people may make about realism also change from one genre
to the next. People “see” different genres as more or less realistic (Busselle,
2003). But more importantly, when considering different categories, people
make fundamentally different kinds of realism judgments, applying different
criteria and maybe using different judgment processes.
This has important implications for the issue of genre-specific cultivation
effects (Bilandzic & Busselle, 2008; Bilandzic & Rössler, 2004; Morgan &
Shanahan, 2010). Audiences likely have different realism expectations about
portrayals in different genres or content categories. A premise or situation may
be noticeably unrealistic in one genre or context (e.g., a medical drama) but
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may seem perfectly normal in another (e.g., fantasy, reality-contests). The chal-
lenge for scholars is to match conceptualization and measurement with con-
tent, context, and research focus (Konijn et al., 2009).
Real as the Default
When reflecting on his own writing of Lyrical Ballads, Samuel Coleridge said
that he sought “…a semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shad-
ows of imagination that willing suspension of disbelief for the moment, which
constitutes poetic faith” (Coleridge, 1817/1907, p. 6, emphasis added).2
The concept has come to represent a set of implicit assumptions about audi-
ences’ negotiations of the transition between reality and fiction. Coleridge
described a willingness to believe, a withholding of rational judgment, and a
willingness to reactivate judgment or “bring judgment back into play”
(Bormann, 1972, p. 58). We consider these three processes in turn.
The notion of a willingness to believe, which facilitates a suspension of dis-
belief, requires the assumption that media consumers are incredulous by
default. This assumption is questionable. Certainly, individuals may approach
content skeptically, for example, when faced with content one perceives as per-
suasive or with news content from a distrusted source. However, even to reject
media content, audiences must comprehend information before disbelieving
it. Then, subsequent to comprehension, we may evaluate the veracity of that
information and conclude that it is in some way flawed. However, such sub-
sequent evaluation requires both cognitive resources and motivation (Gilbert,
1991; Gilbert & Gill, 2000; Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993). This rea-
soning prompted Prentice and Gerrig (1999) to conclude that disbelief is con-
structed rather than suspended. When applied to the notion of media realism,
this suggests that individuals may evaluate information and conclude that it is
unrealistic, but without such evaluation, story relevant information is simply
accepted (Bradley & Shapiro, 2004; Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008; Shapiro et
al., 2010). Indeed, Coleridge (1817/1907) foreshadowed this when referring
to “…that negative faith, which simply permits the images presented to work
by their own force, without either denial or affirmation of their real exis-
tence…” (p. 107).
The point is that one does not anticipate the possibility of unrealistic con-
tent, any more than one assumes that a barista cannot make a good cappuc-
cino or that a friend’s offer to buy a cappuccino is insincere. Both are
possibilities, but not possibilities we necessarily consider. Moreover, if we are
unaware of the possibilities, we also must be unaware of their absence or that
the possibilities did not materialize. Simply stated, we cannot dismiss a possi-
bility that we have not previously considered.
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The second process suggested by Coleridge—a withholding of rational
judgment—has two components. First, fictional spaces open up a possible alter-
native world; this, however, is not the same as falseness, against which audi-
ences need to argue. If fictional content does not make a claim of truth, then
audiences do not have to withhold judgment about falseness. Thus, we argue
that audiences are not bothered by fictionality. Instead, as with any other judg-
ment, audiences evaluate when necessary. Individuals make judgments and
draw conclusions about the people and events they witness in stories, regard-
less of whether those stories are fictional, nonfictional, or some hybrid of the
two, just as they make judgments about all types of information; we are dis-
appointed in the woman who succumbs to an unworthy suitor, and con-
cerned for the child who becomes separated from his mother. This is true
regardless of whether it occurs in a sci-fi film, in a documentary, or in our own
neighborhood as told to us by a friend.
The third process suggested by Coleridge focuses on activating rational
judgment. We have argued that rational judgment is not suspended. But we
have also argued that judgment about truth status is activated only when
prompted or required. In order to address this we need to consider narrative
processing in more detail.
Narrative Processing and Realism Judgments
Consumers of narratives are active in constructing mental models of the story
world, the characters who populate that world, and the events that impact them
(Bordwell, 1985; Ohler, 1994; Oatley, 2002; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser,
1995). Readers and viewers combine information from a text (novel, film, tel-
evision program) with previously existing, story-relevant knowledge, to construct
these mental representations (Prentice, Gerrig, & Bailis, 1997; Rapp, Gerrig, &
Prentice, 2001). The primary activity of the reader or audience member is to pro-
gressively construct a mental representation that is coherent both with respect
to earlier points in the story and with what the individual brings to the story in
the form of previous knowledge and experience (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008;
Graesser et al., 2002). The event-indexing model (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser,
1995) suggests that during the process of comprehending a story, readers mon-
itor changes in five dimensions (time, space, protagonists’ identity, causality, and
intentionality).3 To the extent that these changes can be incorporated into exist-
ing mental representations, the narrative is coherent and comprehension pro-
gresses relatively smoothly. Conversely, if new information is inconsistent with
existing representations then construction should be interrupted and compre-
hension should suffer (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser,
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1995). Worth (2004) suggested that the consumer of narrative creates belief
rather than suspends disbelief, and that one cannot construct a narrative world
and at the same time believe that world is false.
Bordwell (1985) pointed to the hypothesis-testing nature of narrative com-
prehension. As new information becomes available audience members antic-
ipate its implications for characters and events. Based on characters’ traits and
motivations some behaviors can be reasonably expected from a character, but
others cannot (Rapp et al., 2001). In fact, some reactions would seem absurd.
Consider a scenario in which a man meets two muggers on the street at night.
The man is threatened at knife point and ordered to hand over his wallet. First,
in the mind of the audience, the man and the muggers are neither real nor
unreal. They simply are a potential victim and two muggers. Second, depend-
ing on previous character development, the audience suspects a range of pos-
sible responses from the potential victim. The victim as a sensible man may
remain calm and hand over the wallet, hoping the muggers will be satisfied.
The victim as a cowardly man may sob and beg for his life while forfeiting his
wallet. The victim as an action hero may employ his martial arts skills to teach
a lesson in retaliatory justice. Each of these responses would be coherent rel-
ative to the way the character has been developed, or the mental model of the
character (Rapp et al., 2001). Comprehension of the narrative and construc-
tion of the story will progress to the extent that the man’s response is consis-
tent with the audience’s expectations, given their knowledge of the character
and his situation. Of course, the man’s responses are not so strictly pro-
scribed. The coward may remain calm; the sensible man may cower, and the
action hero may not use violence. But the response must be consistent with
the character. The coward cannot inexplicably become a martial artist and the
hero cannot cower, unless the inconsistent behavior is somehow justified in the
story. Moreover, unless fantastical story-world rules have been introduced,
none of the men can shape-shift or become invisible.
From this one can conclude, generally, that information that is inconsis-
tent with the characters, situations, or the story world should activate some
type of realism evaluation in the audience. But without such observed incon-
sistency, the audience has no reason to consider the authenticity, verisimilitude,
or realism of the information presented. This suggests we should fundamen-
tally change the way we think about perceived realism. It seems unlikely that
audience members assess realism in the narratives they consume, at least while
consuming them. Conversely, they should notice if the narrative is unrealistic.
This is because not being realistic manifests as inconsistency between obser-
vations and expectations. These expectations are based on what is known
about characters, situations, and story worlds as well as assumptions based on
real world experience. These inconsistencies should interrupt the smooth
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construction of mental representations of the story, which, in turn, should
lower engagement and enjoyment.
This has implications for audiences seeking programs as well as genres. For
example, Papacharissi and Mendelson (2007) adapted realism items to meas-
ure “how true to life viewers understand reality [-TV] depictions to be” (p.
363). They found that the perceived realism of reality programming was pos-
itively related to hours of viewing and watching for entertainment and relax-
ation motivations. Thus, perceiving a lack of realism in a reality-based program,
within the constraints of realism expectations about that program, may deter
future viewing of similar content.
Implications for Perceived Realism
and Cultivation Research
Research into the perceived realism of media and its role in media effects has
focused on the extent to which audiences find what they consume to be real-
istic. Gerbner and Gross (1976) argued that “viewers assume [television sto-
ries] take place against the backdrop of reality” and wondered “how often and
to what degree viewers suspend their disbelief in the reality of the symbolic
world” (p. 178). Potter (1986) concluded that “viewers who believe that tel-
evised content is real are more likely to be influenced by it than viewers who
believe the content to be fictional or stylized” (p. 161). This assumption of
active realism monitoring also is apparent in the most recent research (e.g.,
Barriga, Shapiro, & Jhaveri, 2009; Konijn et al., 2009; Quick, 2009; Shapiro
et al., 2010) and prevails across research into different content areas includ-
ing non-fiction (e.g., Chiricos et al., 2000), fiction (e.g., Quick, 2009), real-
ity-based content (Nabi et al., 2006), and even public service announcements
(e.g., Pinkleton, Austin, & Van de Vord, 2010).
Conventional wisdom suggests that mediated stories are taken as funda-
mentally different from real world events. Then the two somehow become con-
fused, or one is recognized as a reflection of the other, resulting in the
mediated world contaminating understandings of the actual world. However,
our arguments suggest that mediated and actual worlds are not perceived as
fundamentally different, at least as they are being experienced. For example,
as we have argued elsewhere, while watching a mystery, viewers do not think
of a detective as a fictional detective or a realistic detective. They think of him
or her only as a detective trying to solve a crime (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2008).
Given this, it may be more productive to ask how often, under what condi-
tions, and to what effect viewers find content to be unrealistic. There are a
number of reasons to consider changing our focus from realism to unrealism.
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First, when we measure other communication-related constructs, such as
an attitude, we assume that the construct is salient or will become salient in
the future, perhaps in a purchase or voting decision. However, perceived real-
ism may be an example of what we have referred to as an “asymmetrical” con-
struct, one that individuals become aware of only when it is in a negative state
(Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009). This may be true of attention and understand-
ing as well as realism; we typically are not consciously aware that we are pay-
ing attention, that we understand, or that something is realistic. Instead, we
become aware only when our attention wanes, when we have difficulty under-
standing, or when a portrayal seems unrealistic. If this is the case, common real-
ism measures do not directly measure the construct of interest—observed
unrealism. Instead, at best, they indirectly measure its absence. The implica-
tion here is that cultivation surveys that measure realism may capture very lit-
tle of the unrealism respondents observe while viewing. The unrealism
observed in data may be more a reaction to generalizations about genres or
social desirability related to negative opinions about the medium than instances
of actually observing in stories some lack of authenticity. One suggestion to
address this is the development of measures that more directly assess unreal-
ism. One might ask respondents, for example, if they recall thinking that any-
thing about a medical drama seemed implausible or hard to believe. This may
take the form of a counter-arguing measure (e.g., Jacks & Cameron, 2003;
Wellins & McGinnies, 1977) through a prompted thought listing procedure.
Such a measure may be useful because perceived unrealism judgments could
be thought of as a manifestation of counter-arguing in narrative context. A sim-
ilar alternative may be to ask respondents how often they find themselves think-
ing that a story or portrayal is inaccurate or inauthentic. We might find that
people who report “often” or “very often” are less susceptible to cultivation-
type effects than those who say “never” or “rarely.”
Second, if viewers do not evaluate the realism of content and do not con-
ceive of it as a continuum ranging from less to more realistic then realism can-
not moderate cultivation in the sense we typically think of. Shrum (2001)
demonstrated that television exposure has little influence on social judgments
when viewers are made aware that their judgments may be based on television
sources or examples. It appears that respondents dismiss these sources, upon
reflection, as somehow unreliable or irrelevant. A similar but reverse process may
be at work with perceived realism. When participants are asked about content real-
ism, an evaluation process is activated that otherwise may remain dormant. If the
default state is acceptance when realism judgments are dormant, then merely ask-
ing the question may activate a process that can only move the judgment toward
the negative. That is, if the default is acceptance, then the accurate response on
a scale would be the most positive option. But when realism judgments are
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prompted respondents may search for evidence that content is unrealistic—evi-
dence that may be unrelated or tangentially related to the process of cultivation
and may indicate response values that suggest moderate levels of perceived real-
ism, which inaccurately reflect the acceptance that typically occurs during view-
ing. Thus, asking about the perceived realism of content may activate a process
and introduce variance that is not present under real world conditions.
Third, the proposition that people are susceptible to media effects such as
cultivation unless they perceive content to be unrealistic (and that perceiving
content as unrealistic may be more the exception than the rule) is consistent
with research in narrative persuasion. That research has shown that higher lev-
els of transportation or absorption in stories positively relate to changes in beliefs
and attitudes (Appel & Richter, 2010; Escalas, 2007; Green & Brock, 2000,
Vaughn, Hesse, Petkova, & Trudeau, 2009). From this we might suspect that
stories which are more engaging play a stronger role in the cultivation process.
There are two reasons for this. First, if noticing instances of unrealism is dis-
tracting and interferes with engagement and enjoyment, it also should inter-
fere with a story’s influence on attitudes and beliefs about the real world.
Moreover, to the extent that viewers choose content that is rewarding and avoid
content that is not, viewers should avoid content they perceive as unrealistic for
the very reason that it is less engaging and enjoyable. Thus, over time, indi-
viduals’ overall viewing patterns should tend to move away from content they
perceive to be unrealistic (given their own expectations for that content) and
toward that which does not promote evaluations or judgments related to real-
ism. Put simply, we should expect people to gravitate toward content that does
not fail to meet their implicit expectations of authenticity. If this is the case, real-
ism may not mediate cultivation in a traditional, statistical sense, but in a way
that is more consistent with cultivation theory itself. Specifically, the effect of
perceived unrealism should be to guide individuals’ media choices toward
content they find more engaging, more enjoyable, more consistent with their
extant perceptions of reality, and ultimately to content that is more likely to con-
tribute to and reinforce the social construction of the perceived “real” world.
Notes
1. For discussions of emotions in fictional contexts, see Gendler and Kovakovich (2005)
and Tan (1996).
2. Coleridge was referring to Lyrical Ballads, a collection of poems by Samuel Coleridge
and William Wordsworth, published in 1798.
3. There are a number of different theoretical models that fall under this constructionist
paradigm (Graesser et al., 2002). While they differ in the specific mechanisms they
describe, each proposes some type of construction or integration process in which the
individual must make sense of incoming information in light of existing knowledge.
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